Muaamar Bawtil is the Forum’s Senior Advisor for Yemen. In 2012–2014, he was the Forum’s local program officer supporting the implementation of the project “Supporting the National Dialogue Conference and the Consolidation of Democracy in Yemen”, funded by the Government of Canada. Subsequently, Muammar worked as a political specialist for two years in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Sana’a office. He was also a staffer in the office of the former Yemeni Prime Minister for more than a year. Muammar is originally from Hadramout, Yemen, and received a Bachelor of Arts with a double major in political science and international relations from St. Cloud State University, Minnesota. He is currently completing his Master degree in public policies at University of Regina, Canada. Muaamar is fluent in Arabic and English.
The debate over Yemen’s future state structure is no longer an intellectual luxury or an elite discussion detached from reality. After more than a decade of political upheaval, a devastating war, and the erosion of state institutions, it has become evident that the highly centralized state model that governed Yemen for decades is no longer viable. In this context, federalism emerges as one of the realistic options for rebuilding the state, not as a temporary compromise or a political maneuver, but as a serious framework for governance.
Historically, extreme centralization in Yemen failed to manage the country’s geographic, social, and political diversity. Instead, the state became an instrument for reproducing imbalances in the distribution of power and wealth, contributing to the marginalization of large regions and the creation of environments conducive to conflict. This challenge is not unique to Yemen. Comparative studies have shown that multi-identity states governed through rigidly centralized systems are more prone to internal conflict and instability (Lijphart, 1999).
Recently, federalism has re-emerged forcefully in public debate, particularly in eastern governorates such as Hadhramaut, Al-Mahrah, and Shabwa, where it is viewed as a mechanism for protecting local specificities and ensuring genuine power-sharing. At the same time, the debate remains intense in other areas that perceive federalism as a threat to national unity or a step toward fragmentation. At its core, however, this division reflects a weak public understanding of federalism rather than a fundamental disagreement over the principle of a unified state.
Federalism, according to constitutional and political theory, is not a call for secession or division. Rather, it is a framework for organizing relations between different levels of government within a single sovereign state. It is based on a constitutional division of powers that preserves an effective central authority while granting regional or local governments real authority to manage their own affairs. Experiences from countries such as Canada, Germany, and Switzerland and others demonstrate that federalism can be an effective tool for managing diversity, enhancing stability, and achieving balanced development (Watts, 2008).
That said, federalism is not a panacea, nor can it be transplanted as a ready-made model. Comparative research clearly indicates that the success of federal systems depends on sound constitutional design, clarity in the distribution of competencies, and the presence of institutions capable of managing disputes between the center and the regions (Elazar, 1987). In conflict-affected contexts, federalism can fail if imposed without broad political consensus or if used as a cover for reproducing new centers of power.
In Yemen’s case, the federalism debate intersects with highly sensitive issues, most notably security and the military. Post-conflict experiences elsewhere show that security sector reform cannot be separated from the nature of the state and its system of governance. Yemen’s centralized state failed to produce a unified national army; instead, it entrenched fragmented loyalties and tied security institutions to narrow political centers. Studies by the Forum of Federations indicate that well-designed decentralized or federal systems can provide a more suitable framework for reintegrating forces and regulating civil-military relations, thereby reducing the risk of renewed conflict (Forum of Federations, 2017).
Despite this, public debate in Yemen often reduces federalism to its geographic dimension alone: the number of regions, their boundaries, and their relationship to the southern issue. This reduction strips federalism of its substantive meaning as a comprehensive system of governance that requires deep reforms in public administration, public finance, accountability mechanisms, and state–society relations. Without such understanding, federalism risks becoming a hollow political slogan, manipulable by different actors for contradictory ends.
This underscores the importance of investing in public awareness and capacity-building. In the coming phase, Yemen needs serious research and educational programs that explain different federal models, objectively assess their advantages and disadvantages, and link them to the Yemeni context rather than mechanically imposing them upon it. This approach is not unprecedented. During the National Dialogue Conference period, a major program implemented by the Forum of Federations with support from Canada undertook extensive capacity-building efforts, including workshops in various regions to examine comparative federal experiences. However, the war halted this debate before it could fully mature.
Today, amid shifting power balances and the decline of certain political projects, federalism appears more present than ever as a practical option for redefining the social contract. It does not promise to resolve all crises, but it may offer a more just and stable framework for managing disagreements rather than allowing them to explode into violence. The fundamental question, therefore, is not whether federalism is ideal, but whether continued adherence to centralization—with all its failures—remains a viable option.
Ultimately, any serious discussion of federalism should begin not with institutional blueprints alone, but with people’s lived realities, needs, and genuine aspirations. Federalism should not be promoted as a technocratic solution or an elite driven project, but rather as a clear and informed public choice, articulated through inclusive consultations and legitimate political processes. In Yemen’s context, advocating for federalism is defensible only if it emerges as an option embraced by a broad majority seeking a state that is more responsive, just, and accountable.
Likewise, in light of Yemen’s experience and that of other countries emerging from complex conflicts, federalism—if designed rationally and anchored in clear constitutional guarantees—appears to be among the least costly and most realistic options for rebuilding the Yemeni state on the basis of partnership rather than domination.
References:
- Elazar, Daniel J. (1987). Exploring Federalism. University of Alabama Press.
- Watts, Ronald L. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. McGill-Queen’s University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press.
- Forum of Federations (2017). Federalism and Conflict Management, policy studies.
